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In The S11preme Court
of the State of Utah
ALVIE CARTER,

"'
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs-

M. A. LINDNER and ERMA M. LINDNER,
his wife; and W. A. WOOD and ARRAH
B. WOOD, his wife,
Defendants, Cross Claimants
and Appellants,

Case No.
11578

-vs-

FRANK R. DOVER and SHIRLEY MAY
DOVER, his wife,
Defendants, Cross Def end ants
and Respondents.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action to quiet title to a parcel of land
in Salt Lake City owned by respondents but enclosed with a fence by appellants.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court quieted the plaintiff's title to the
property but failed to award any damages for losses
incurred by respondent Carter.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Respondents request that the judgment of the
trial court quieting title to the property be a_ffirmed
but that the trial court be directed to award dama_ges to respcnden t Carter for his losses.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The prope:r°~' dssiginic_ted as the "Carter property" in appsllants' brief ~Ncs ovv·ned by one Robert
Dover from 19'.~G until GEcernber of 1957 'Nhen he
conveyed it to Frank R. Dover and Shirley M.
Dovor, his wife. They in turn contarcted to sell the
property to Alvie Carter, the plaintiff-respondent, in
1964, and Carter took possession thereof. In 1955
Lindner and Wood, the defendants-a_ppellants, purchased th8 proper+.y adjoining the Carter property
on the E:ist and Sout:'.-1 and constructed a fence over
the Carter propsrty theroby c1e~):ri_7j.,,_q Dovrors, and
later Carter, from using tho South 24.35 feet of the
Carter p:".'opertv. m. 29-30). Lindner claims that the
fence was erecfed -with the permission of Robert
Dover, who was deceased at the time of trial. (R. 63).
However, when Frank Dever asked Lindner in 1957
why the £enc:e had been placed so for to the North
of the boundary line, Lindner answered that it was
placed there to ma__l<_e up for the encroachment by
Dover on the East. No mention was made of any
agreement vrith or oermission from Robert Dover
to place the fence there. Frank Dover requested
Liriciner b rs!Y'C'.o::; -foe fence. Lindner replied that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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if he wa_nted the fence moved he would have to
go to court. (R. 75-76). Dover further testified that
he had lived on the Carter property for many years
and that his father had owned the Lindner property
for many years and that the Lindner property had
been enclosed with a wire fence which ran along
its West boundary only to the actual property line
of the Carter property and never extended beyond
that. There had also been some coal sheds on the
actual property line. These sheds were probably
removed when Lindner put up the fence but the
old wire fence was still in existence until the new
fence was erected. (R. 73-74, 76-78).

Carter requested Lindner and Wood to remove
the fence when he took possession of the property
in 1964 but they again refused. Carter has conducted
an antique business on his property which requires
substantial storage and display space. (R. 30). Because Carter has been denied the use of this property, he has been required to rent storage space
elsewhere at a cost and loss to him of $1,880.00.
(R. 48).
In 1965 Lindner and Wood executed and recorded a deed conveying their property from their
partnership to themselves as individuals. In that
deed they did not include the 24.35 feet of property
to which they now claim ownership. (Ex. P-12). At
that time they were making no claim of title to the
property in dispute and were not sure that they
owned it. (R. 68).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DEAD MAN'S STATUTE BARS ANY EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED CONVERSATION BETWEEN ROBERT DOVER AND M. A. LINDNER.

Since Lindner admitted that Robert Dover was
now dead, plaintiff objected to Lindner's competency as a witness with respect to any evidence of a
conversation with Robert Dover. The court reserved
dscision en the objection and allowed the testimony
subject to the objection. (R. 62). Section 78-24-2(3) of
the Utah Code Annotated states:
The following persons cannot be witnesses: (3)
A party to any civil action, suit, or proceeding
... when the adverse party in such action, suit
or proceeding claims or opposes, sues or defends, as . . . assignee or grantee, directly or
remotely, of c_;uch heir, legatee or devisee (of any
deceased person), as to any statement by, or
transaction with, such deceased ... person ...

In this case we have an alleged conversation between a deceased person and the defendant Lindner, who is a party to this action, and the adverse
parties are grantees and assignees of the deceased
person. Clearly the statute was intended to prevent
the kind of testimony offered by Mr. Lindner and
therefore the objection thereto should have been
sustained. This would delete from the record the
only possible evidence on which defendants could
base any claim to the property in dispute. Judgment
for respondents must follow.
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POINT II
APPELLANTS HAVE NOT PROVED THE REQUIREMENTS NECESSARY TO E S T A B L I S H
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE.

Appellants' brief cites a number of cases from
foreign jurisdictions in an attempt to support their
claims. In doing so they fail to distinguish and in
fact confuse the different requirements for boundary
by acquiescence and boundary by agreement. These
are two separate doctrines in the law and must be
discussed separately.
Boundary by acquiescence is discussed extensively in 3 U~ah Law Review 504 (1953) and the
prerequisites for application of this doctrine were
most recently set out as follows in Fuoco v. Williams,
15 Utah 2d 156, 389 P.2d 143 (1956):
( 1) Occupation up to a visible line marked by
monuments, fences or buildings, (2) Mutual
Acquiescence in the line as the boundary,
for a long period of years, ( 4) by adjoining
land owners.

:cq

In the instant case these prerequisites were not
met. The testimony of Mr. Lindner as to a conversation with Robert Dover may as easily imply an intent
to permit Lindner to use his land temporarily as it
would an attempt to establish a boundary. Furthermore, it cannot be said that there was mutual acquiescence when Frank Dover expressed his objection to the fence in 1957 (R. 76), and Mr. Carter
also objected after he came into possession. (R. 30).
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The :i.cquiescence must continue for a long period of ti:ne which in Utah has been interpreted to
mean at least twenty years. See 3 Utah Law Review
504, 506 (1953); King v. Fronk. 14 Utah 2d 135, 378
P.2d 893, 897 (1963). Here only twelve years elapsed
between the alleged agreement and the institution
of this suit with objections to the fence having been
made in the interim.
It is also significant that appellants made a deed
to their property in 1965 without including the property South of the fence which they claim to own.
(P-12). This indicates a lack of acquiescence on their
part. They were making no claim to the Carter property or any pa.rt of it at that time. (R. 68).
It is a.lso a requirement for boundary by acquiescence tha.t there be some dispute or uncertainty as
to the location of the true boundary. Nunley v.
Walker. 13 Utah 2d 105, 369 P.2d 117 (1962); Willie v.
Local ~~alty Co., 110 Utah 523, 531, 175 P.2d 78, 723
(946); Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 276 Pac. 912 (1928).
In this case there is absolutely no evidence of any
dispute or uncertainty as to the location ofl the true
line. In fact the evidence shows that defendants had
a prior fence which enclosed only their own property and none of plaintiff's property which was removed when the new fence was erected. This old
fence would have located the actual boundary and
there would not have been any uncertainty. Furthermore the abstract of title to the Lindner property (Ex.
D-13) clearly shows that the property description did
not begin in the center of the street as appellants
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state was possible. The description starts at the edge
of the street and runs South from there.
Furthermore, the claim of uncertainty might be
credible if the dista.nce between the actual boundary
and the fence were only a few feet. But here there
is a difference of 24.35 feet. On a lot only 16.5 feet
wide, as is the case with the Carter property, a depth
of 24.35 feet is ra.ther large and would certainly be
noticed. Under these circumstances it is not reasonable to assume that there was any uncertainty about
the boundary linie when the new fence was erected.
POINT III
APPELLANTS HAVE NOT PROVED THE REQUIREMENTS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH BOUNDARY BY AGREEMENT.

This is apparently the doctrine relied upon by
defendants. Where a boundary line is in dispute or
uncertain, adjoining land owners may orally agree
upon a certain line as the boundary between their
properties and such agreement will be binding on
them and their successors if they occupy and possess
the land up to the boundary and acquiesce in the
established line for a long period of time. See 3
Utah Law Review 504 (1953) at 504, Footnote 1, and
the cases discussed therein.
The requirements here are similar to those for
boundary by acquiescence, the difference being that
an actual agreement is necessary. However, in spite
of the claims made in defendants' brief by citing
cases from foreign jurisdictions they cannot escape
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the necessity for showing uncertainty as to the true
line and acquiescence in the established line for a
long perbd of time. The lack of these elements in
this case requires the court to affirm the lower court's
finding in plaintiff's favor.
Them are few cases in Utah applying or discussing the doctrine of boundary by agreement. Every
Utah case applying the rule has contained the element of acquiescence in the agreed upon line. In
Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 66, 276 Pac. 912, 916
(1928), the court noted that the fence which marked
the claimed boundary had been established "for a
sufficiently long period to support" the claim. In
Rydalch v. Anderson. 37 Utah 99, 112, 107 Pac. 25,
30 0910), the parties had agreed upon a boundary
line but vvere allowed to abandon it in favor of the
true line as established by a later survey. And as
noted in 3 Utah Law Review 504 (1953) at 504, Footnote 1:
If acquiescence were not requi1cd to m:ik:~ : >
agreement binding, the abandonment of the
agreed boundary would have been contrary to
the Statute of Frauds as it would have become
the true boundary and as the parties would
not likely at that time have been uncertain
about or disputing the boundary.

Blanchard v. Smith. 123 Utah 119, 255 P.2d 729, 730
(1953) states that "neighbors by oral agreement may
establish a common boundary which, after sufficently long acquiescence, cannot be disestablished."
Acquiescence for a long time therefore being a
necessary element to appellants' case, the failure
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to show i: and respondents' showing of no acquiescence more than justifies the lower court's judgment.
Moreover, appellants have failed to show by a
preponderance of the evidence the existence of an
agreeme!"1t, the most important element of their case.
The lower court found in favor of respondents after
observing and hearing the witnesses and its findings are therefore entitled to great weight. Even if
there had. been an agreement, Blanchard v. Smith,
supra, implies that such an agreement is not binding
if arrived at by mutual mistake, citing 8 AM. JUR.
Boundaries § 77. This same authority is now found
in 12 AM. JOR. 2d Boundaries § 82, at 618, and is
quoted here:
If adjoining landowners are in doubt as to the
location of a boundary line between their lands,
neither assur'ling to know its location, and,
upon this basis, undertake by a parol agreement
to fix a line as the boundary line, such agreement, when executed, is to be given effect notwithstanding they may have been mistaken as
to the location of the true line, if there has been
no fraud or concealment on the part of one
party which would mislead the other. If, however, the parties undertake by a parol agreement to fix the location of a boundary line
under the belief that they are fixing the true
boundary line, when, in fact, it is not, their
agreement is not binding and may be set aside
by either party upon the discovery of the
mistake, unless there is some element of
estoppe! whcih would prevent it, as where the
rights of innocent third parties have intervened.
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This principle is extremely important here since
from Mr. Lindner's own testimony, he and Mr. Dover
were not attempting to fix a boundary line in place
of the trut:: line whose location was unknown. Rather
they were attempting to fix a line under the belief
that they were fixing the true boundary line. According to Lindner, Dover said "You can put your
fence here. I think this is my property line." (R. 63).
Based on this mutual mistake as to the true boundary
line, the supposed agreement could be set aside by
either party. In a situ;;i.tion where one party may
otherwise be innocently deprived of 24.35 feet of
his property, justice demands that such an agreetnent,· if made, be set aside. The lower court's judgment should therefore be affirmed.
POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
AW ARD DAMAGES TO RESPONDENT CARTER FOR
HIS LOSSES.

Carter testified at the trial that because he was
deprived of the use of his property by Lindner and
Wood, he had been required to rent storage space
elsewhere at a cost to him of $1,880.00 over a four
year period. m. 48). Carter conducts an antique business on his property which requires extensive display and storage space. (R 30). He demanded that
Lindner and \J'J ood remove the fence so he could
make use of the balance of his property. Their refusal to do so forced him to look elsewhere for space
and his cost to obtain such space was not controverted at the trial. Since Lindner and Wood wrongSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fully deprived Carter of the use of his property,
lia_bilitv for the damages caused thereby should follow. The court's failure to award such damages was
an error ·which should be corrected on this appeal.
CONCLUSION
By introducing the Abstract of Title and the contract showing plaintiff's interest, plaintiff presented
a prima fa.cia case of title to the disputed property
in Frank Dover and his wife subject to plaintiff's concract rights. The burden of proof to show boundary
by acquiescence or by agreement was then upon
defendants. The Dead Man's Statute precludes any
evidence to support their claim and even such evic~ence as was offered by defendants fails to show the
necessary elements required by the law of the state
of Utah. The lower court's decree quieting title to
the property in Dovers and Carter should therefore
be :i.ffirm ed.
Respectfully submitted,
BACKMAN, BACKMAN &

CLrYo_f::\

By,\~'1~
RALPH J. MARSH
1111 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Respondent
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